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NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE
PUBLIC-GOODS PROBLEM*
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National defense, according to the popular ideal, is a service provided by
the state to its citizens. I It entails protection from aggressors outside the state's
jurisdiction, usually foreign states. TI1e most sophisticated theoretical justification
for government provision of this service is the public-goods argument. Roughly
stated , this argument claims that the incentive to free -ride inhibits people from
providing enough protection from fore ign aggression voluntarily. Thus , it is in
people 's best interests to coerce themselves. Taxa tion is necessary to ensure
sufficient military expenditures.
Many opponents of arms control treat the public-goods problem as if it
alone were sufficient to discredit any radical reduction in military spending. We,
however, will challenge this presumption. This article will not question the validity,
realism, or relevance of the public-goods concept.2 Indeed, we think that the core
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1
"the state" we mean government. We use the two terms interchangeably, unlike many political
scientists, who use the term the "state" either for wha t we are calling the "nation" i.e., the government
plus its subjects, or for some vague intt: rmedialt: entity which is less than the entire nation but more
than just the government. We recognize tha t the sta te and its subjects can often be intricately
interwoven into a complex web of mixed institutions, but the distinction is still fundamentaL
2
Although we will not take u p these issues here, some economists suggest that the characteristics that
make something a public good are a!Jnost never physically inherent in the good or service but are
rather nearly always a conse quence of choosing one out of many feasible methods for produ cing the
good or ser vice. See Cowen-19RS, pp. 53-63; Palmer-1983, pp. l-5, p . 11; Block-1983, pp. 1-34;
Roth hard-1981, pp. S32-46; Goldin-1977, pp. 53-71: and Bmbaker- l 97S, pp. 147-61.
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service within national defense - safety from violence and aggression - captures
the essence of a public good more fully than economists have appreciated. But this
essential feature, rather than providing a solid justification for heavy military
expenditures, offers one of the most powerful objections to such a government
policy.
We will first reexamine the nature of national defense in order to clarify
the underlying goal of military spending. The presumption that the state's military
establishment automatically provides safety from aggression needs careful scrutiny.
The taxation necessary to fuel military expansion often generates more public
goods problems than it circumvents. This leads us to the more general question of
how the free-rider incentive is ever overcome, despite theoretical predictions to the
contrary. Public-goods theory seems to misunderstand human nature, by
exaggerating the importance of narrow self-interest and confining attention to
artificially static Prisoners' Dilemmas. A more social and dynamic model of human
action is better able to account for the observed fact that free-rider problems are
overcome in the real world all the time.

2. What is a public good?
Economists have called many things public goods and then endlessly
debated whether the label really applies, but national defense has remained the
quintessential public good. Although rarely discussed in detail, it is universally
invoked as the classic representative of the public-goods category. 3
Two characteristics distinguish a pure public good from a private good,
and both are exhibited by the case of national defense. The first is nonrival
consumption. One customer's consumption of a marginal unit of the good or
service does not preclude another's consumption of the same unit. For example, in
an uncrowded theater, two patrons' enjoyment of the same movie is nonrival. The
second characteristic is nonexcludability. The good or service cannot be provided
to an individual customer without simultaneously providing it to others. The owner
of a dam, for example, cannot provide flood control separately to the individual
farmers residing downstream.4
Although these two characteristics frequently come in conjunction with
each other, they do not necessarily have to. Nonexcludability from the dam's
flood-control services is accompanied by nonrival consumption of the services
3 Examples of economists treating national defense as the quintessential public good include
Samuelson-1976, p. 159; Buchanan/Flowers-1975, p. 27; and Head/Shoup-1969, p. 567. Among the few
attempts of economists to look in any detail at national defense as a public good are Thompson-1974,
pp. 755-82; and Wagner-1975, pp. 199-221.
4 Paul A. Samuelson's two classic articles, Samuelson-1954, pp. 387-89, and Samuelson-1955, pp. 350-56,
are generally credited as being the first formal statements of modern public-goods theory. Important
further developments in public-goods theory include Samuelson-1958, pp. 332-38; Musgrave-1959;
Buchanan/Kafoglis-1963, pp. 403-14; Demsetz-1964, pp. 11-26; Minasian-1964, pp. 71-80; Baumol-1965;
McKean/Minasian-1966, pp. 14-23; Davis/Winston-1967, pp. 360-73; Buchanan-1968; Misnan-1969,
pp. 329-48; Head/Shoup/1969; Head-1974, SnidaV1979, pp. 532-66.
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among the various farmers, but the owner of a nearly empty theater can still
exclude additional patrons. Ye t, according to the public-goods argument, either
characteristic alone causes "market failure" - that is, an allocation o f resources
that is less than Pareto optimal. Thus, either can be sufficient to justify state
intervention. 5
Even national defense is not a pure public good. Americans in Alaska and
Hawaii could very easily be excluded from the U.S. government's defense
perimeter, and doing so might enhance the military value of at least conventional
U.S. forces to Americans in the other forty-eight states. But in general, an additional
ICBM in the U.S. arsenal can simultaneously protect everyone within the country
without diminishing its services. In that respect, consumption of national defense is
nonrival. Moreover, a technique that defends just a single American from the Soviet
state without necessarily defending his or her entire community and perhaps the
entire nation is difficult to visualize. That makes national defense nonexcludable as
well.
We are going to focus, however, only upon nonexcludabili ty. If
consumption of a service is nonrival, but businessmen and entrepreneurs can
exclude those who do not pay for it, then they still have strong incentives to
provide the service. The most serious "market failure" that is alleged to result is
underutilization of the service. Some people will be prevented from benefiting
from the quantity of the service that has been produced, even though permitting
them to do so costs nothing. Furthermore, even this imperfection will dissipate if
the market permits discriminatory pricing.6
On the other hand, nonexcludability creates opportunities for free riders ,
who will pay for the service only if doing so is absolutely necessary to receive it.
From the perspective of economic self interest, every potential customer has an
incentive to try to be a free rider. If enough of them act on this incentive, the
service will not be produced at all, or at least not enough of it.
Another way to think about nonexcludability is as a positive externality in
its purest form. Many goods and services generate additional benefits for people
other than those who directly consume and pay for them. There is often no way for
the producers of these goods to charge those who receive these external benefits.
A nonexcludable good or service is one where the positive externalities are not just
an incidental by-product but rather constitute the major benefit of the good or
service.7

5 Much o f the literature has co nceded that, strictly speaking, very few actual goods or se1vices exhibit
either of the public-good characteristics in its polar form. Instead, in the real world we encounter a
range of goods and services for which the potential capacity and qua lity of noru·ival consumption is
increasing or for which the costs of exclusion are increasing.
6 We have slightly understated the supposed "market failure " from non rival consumption wi th
excludability. The qua ntity of the public good could also be nonoptimal. There is a vast economic
literature debating the intricacies of nonrival consumption. Some of the highlights include Samuclson
1969b, pp. 26-30, Dcmset?.-1970, pp. 293-306; Thompson-1968, pp. 1-12; Ekelund/Hulett-1973, pp. 369
87; Dcmsetz-1973, pp. 389-405; Oakland-1 974, pp. 927-39; Lec-1977 , pp. 403-20; Borcherding-1978,
pp. 111-32; and llums/ Walsh-1981, pp. 166-91.
7 On the relationship of public goods and•externalities, see Samuclson-1969a, pp. 98-123; Buchanan
196R p. 75; Head-1974, pp. Hl4-213; and Mishan-1969.

J

~

... ,

.

I .

.

'
I

356 journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines

I

I

Clearly, the justification for the state's provision of national defense does
not stem from any major concern that in its absence protection services would be
produced but underutilized. Rather, it stems from the assumption that, unless
taxation or some other coercive levy forces people to contribute, national defense
will be inadequately funded and therefore its core service of safety from aggression
will be underproduced. It is this widely held but rarely examined asswnption tha t
we wish to question.

1

3. What is national defense?

:

.. ,

Before we ca n explore the free-ride r dynamics of the state's military
establishment, we must clarify the meaning of the term "national defense." The
public-goods justification for military expenditures rests upon a fundamental
equivocation over exactly what service national defense entails. When economists
discuss natio nal defense, the core service they usually have in mind, explicitly or
implicitly, is protection of people's lives, property, and liberty from fore ign
aggressors. This also appears to be what people have in mind when they fear
foreign conquest, particularly in the case of the American fear of Soviet conquest.
People throughout the world believe that their own government, no matter how
disagreeable, defends them from foreign governments, which they think would be
even more oppressive.
This defense of the people is not synonymous with another service that
goes under the same "national defense" label: protection of the state itself and its
territorial integrity. Historically, the state has often embarked on military
adventures unrelated to the defense of its subjects. If this were not the case, people
would require no protection from foreign states in the first p lace. Many Americans
seriously doubt that the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia had very
much to do with protecting their liberty. One defense-budget analyst, Earl Ravena},
contends that nearly two-thirds of U.S. military expenditures goes toward the
defense of wealthy allied nations in Europe and Asia and has little value for the
defense of Americans. s
The distinction between the two meanings of national defense does not
apply only when the state engages in foreign intervention or conquest. Even
during unambiguously defensive wars, the state often systematically sacrifices the
defense of its subjects to the defense of itself Such universal war measures as
conscription, confiscatory taxation, rigid economic regulation, and suppression of
dissent aggress against the very citizens whom the state is presumably protecting.
People believe the state defends their liberty; in fact, many end up surrendering
much of their liberty to defend the state.
People of course may consider some trade-off worth it. They may accept
the costs and risks of the state's protection in order to reduce the risks and costs of
foreign conquest. But in most discussions of national defense, the aggressive acts

8 Ravenal-1984. See also Russett-1970, pp. 91-126.
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taken by the government against itS own subjects are arbitrarily excluded from the
discussion. It is this frequently overlooked cost which is suggested in Randolph
Bourne's famous observation: "War is the health of the State. "9
In other words, the national interest and the public good do not
automatically coincide. We do not deny the possibility of an incidental relationship
between the defense of the state and the defense of the people. But in the next
section, we will present general reasons why we think this relationship is not as
strong as usually supposed. Before we can do that, we must fully expose the
conceptual gulf between the two meanings of national defense.
The pervasive doctrine of nationalism obscures this fundamental distinction.
Nationalism treats nations as collective entities, applying principles drawn from the
analysis of individual interaction to the international level. In a war between two
nations, the nationalist model focuses on essentially two parties: nation A and nation
B. As in fights between individuals, one of these two nations is the aggressor,
whereas the other is the defender. As a result, the model axiomatically equates
protecting the state with protecting its subjects.
The basic flaw in the nationalist model is its collectivist premise. Although
the model informs many of the formal economic analyses of international relations,
it represents a glaring example of the fallacy of composition. The state simply is
not the same thing as its subjects. Democracies are sometimes referred to as
"governments of the people," but this is, at best, rhetorical sloppiness. The state
and the people interpenetrate one another and in complex ways, but they clearly
do not have exactly the same purposes or interests.
Consequently, any conflict between two nations involves not just two
parties, but at least four the state governing nation A, the state governing nation B,
the people with the (mis)fortune to live under state A, and the people with
the (mis)fortune to live under state B. Whatever the merits of a dispute between
states A and B, the dispute need not divide a significant portion of people A from
people B.lo
Abandoning this collectivist identification of the State with its subjects
exposes the critical insight about the national-defense service. If one is truly
concerned about defense of peoples' lives, property, and liberty, then the transfer
of their capital city from one location to another is not intrinsically significant. In
some cases it might even be thought an improvement. Many Americans are
convinced that the territory constituting Russia is in a very real sense already
conquered - by the Soviet government. Some even believe that the Soviet people
would fare better with Washington, D.C., as their capital city. What ultimately
·matters is whether transferring the capital city brings the citizens a net loss or gain.
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9 Bourne-1964, pp. 65-104. A general substantiation (or refutation) of Bourne's observation has so far
not attracted the professional energies of any hist01ian, perhaps because they feel no need to belabor
the obvious. There are lots of stud ies showing the growth of state power in particular countries during
patticular wars, but vety few that even treat a single country during more than one war, or more than a
single country during one war. A few exceptions that have come to our attention include, Rossiter-1948;
Ekirch-1956; Higgs-1987; Tilly-1975; Tilly-1 985; and Hale-1985.
10
We cite examples of economic models exhibiting the nationalistic fallacy of composition below. One
of the very few written challenges to the nationalistic model is Rothbard-1974, pp. 70-80. We have
profited greatly from this pathhreaking essay.
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The danger therefore is not foreign conquest per se, but the amount of
power the conquering government can successfully wield. In the final analysis,
protection from foreign states is not a unique service. It is a subset of a more
general service: protection from aggression by anyone- or any state. Whether we
formally label an oppressive state "foreign" or "domestic" becomes a secondary
consideration.
Pe ople admittedly may highly value their own state's preservation and
glorification, in and of itself. Their government' s m ilitary establishment may
directly enter their utility functions, the same way their favorite baseball or football
team does. But nationalism is not just a subjective preference. It is also a positive
social theory, as legitimately subject to criticism for its policy recommendations as
any other. The military's coercive funding unfortunately prevents people from
revealing their true preferences about national d efense d irectly and
unambiguously. Some citizens may still want a huge and expensive military
establishment even if they discover that it gives them less protection than they
thought. But meanwhile, an examination of whether military expansion truly does
defend p eople's lives, property, and liberty is still in order.ll

.•:

4. The Free-Rider Dynamics of Government Intervention
When Paul Samuelson first formalized public-good s theory , many
economists unreflectively subscribed to what Harold Demsetz has called the
nirvana approach to public policy. Demonstrating some "market fai lure" with
respect to an abstract op timum was considered sufficient to justify state action.
Economists assumed that the costless, all-knowing, and ben evolent sta te could
simply and easily correct any failure.
Since then, e conomists have become far more realistic. Public-goods
theory has advanced to the point where it is now an exercise in comparative
institutions. Demonstrating "ma rket fa ilure" is no longer sufficient. One must
compare the market with ·the state, not as one wishes the state would behave in
some ideal realm, but as it must behave in the real world. To justify state action,
one must show the agents of government have the capacity and the incentive to do
a better job than p articipants in the market. Can the state provide the public good
without costs that exceed the benefits? And is there some incentive structure that
would conceivably ensure that it do so?l2
Economists within the field of public choice h ave done some of the most
important work on the comparative capabilities of the state -by applying public
goods insights to political action itself. They h ave come to the realization that the
free-rider incentive does not only arise for market enterprises. As Mancur Olson

~

.'

11 For a purely formal approach to people's utility functions with regard to national defense, see
Wagner-1975.
12 Demsetz makes the comparison berween the "nirvana" and "comparative institutions" approaches in
Demsetz-1969, pp. 1-3. See also Coase-1960, pp. 1-44; Buchanan-1962, pp. 17-28; and Turvey-1963 ,
pp. 309-13.
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has demonstrated, the free-rider incentive can arise for any group, especially
political groups wanting to influence state policy. This imparts an inherent public
goods character to all political decisions.l3
Assume that one of us wishes to change some .state policy that we
personally find particularly onerous - for instance, to repeal a tax. We are
members of a fairly large group that will benefit if the tax is repealed. If enough of
us contribute money, time, or other resources to bringing about the tax's repeal,
we wiH succeed and all be better off. The money we save in taxes will more than
reimburse us for our effort. Once the tax is repealed, however, even those who did
not join our campaign will no longer have to pay it. We cannot exclude them from
the benefits of the tax's repeal. They will be free-riders on our political efforts.
Just as in the case of a nonexcludable good in the market, every potential
beneficiary of the tax repeal has an incentive, from the perspective of economic
self-interest, to try to be a free-rider. If enough of them act according to this
incentive, the tax will never be repealed. Public choice economists call this result
"government failure," completely analogous to the "market failu re" caused by
nonexcludability.
Of course, this example grossly oversimplifies the problem. Under a
democratic state, people do not directly purchase changes in state policy; they vote
for them. Or more precisely, some of them vote for representatives who then vote
on and bargain over state policy. If the tax repeal example were completely
accurate, nearly every intentional benefit provided by the state would be a pure
private good, similar to the current salaries of politicians and bureaucrats. With
voting, political entrepreneurs and vote maximizing firms (which are called
political parties) have some incentive to provide us with our tax repeal, even if we
do not politically organize, in order to entice us to vote for them.14
This incentive, however, is not very great. First of all, voting itself gives rise
to a public good. An individual must expend time and other resources to vote, but
he or she can avoid these expenditures by free-riding on the voting of others. Only
in the very remote case where the voter anticipates that, a single vote will decide
the election's outcome does this incentive to free -ride disappear. Consequently, the
political entrepreneur must have some reason to expect that we will vote at all.
And if we do in fact vote, he must in addition have some reason to expect that the
tax repeal, among all the other competing issues, will affect how we vote. Our
forming a political organization to repeal the tax gives him reason to believe both
these things.15
In short, unorganized groups have some influence upon the policies of a
democratic state. But other things being equal, groups that organize and campaign
for policies have a significant advantage. That is presumably why they organize

13

Downs-1957; Buchanan/rullock-1962; Olson-1971; Niskanen-1971 ; Tullock-1967; Breton-1974 ; and
~,fcker-1983, pp. 372-80.
Wagner-1966, pp. 161-70; and Frohlich-1971 , stress the political-entrepreneur thesis. Olson responds
briefly in the second e dition of The Logic of Collective Action, pp. 174-75. Bany-1978, pp. 37-40, and
~rdin-1982, pp. 35-37, go into the weakness of this thesis in greater detail.
· Extended discussions of the outcome of voting as a public good indude Barzei/ Silberberg-1973,
pp. 51-58; Meehl -1977, pp. 11-30; Bucbanan/Brennan-1984, pp. 185-201; and Barry-1978, pp. 13·19.
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and campaign. It strains credulity to suppose that all the people who pour vast
sums of money into political lobbying are utterly mistaken in the belief that they
t hereby gain some leverage on policy. The common observation that special
i nterests have inordinate influence upon a democratic state is without doubt
empirically well founded.
Two variables affect the likelihood that a group will overcome the
freerider problem and successfully organize. These variables operate whether the
g roup is trying to attain nonexcludable benefits on the market or from the state. ·
T he first is the size of the group. The smaller the group, ceteris paribus, the more
likely the members are to organize successfully. The larger the group, the more
difficult it is to involve enough of them to secure the public good.
The second variable is the difference between the value of the public good
t o the members of the group and the cost to them. The greater this difference,
ceteris paribus, the more likely they are to organize successfully. Indeed, if this
difference is great enough, one single member might benefit enough to be willing
t o pay the entire cost and let all the other members of the group free-ride. The
s maller this difference, on the other hand, the more essential becomes the
contribution of each potential member.16
The democratic state therefore makes it much easier to enact policies that
f unnel g reat benefits to small groups than to enact policies that shower small
benefits on large groups. Because of this free-rider-induced "government failure"
the state has the same problem in providing non excludable goods and services as
t he . market  with one crucial difference . When a group successfully provides
itself a public good through the market, the resources it expends pay directly for
t he good. In contrast, when a group successfully provides itself a public good
t hrough the state, the resources it expends pay only the overhead cost of
influencing state policy. The state then finances the public good through taxa tion
o r some coercive substitute.
Moreover; the group that campaigned for the state-provided public good
w ill not in all likelihood bear very much of the coerced cost of the good.
O therwise, they would have had no incentive to go through the state, because
d oing so then costs more in total than simply providing themselves the good
v oluntarily. Instead, the costs will be widely distributed among the poorly
o rganized large group, who may not benefit at all from the public good.
This makes it possible for organized groups to get the state to provide
b ogus public goods, goods and services which in fact cost much more than the

16 One of the clearest expositions of these factors appears in David Friedman's neglected Friedman
1973, pp. 185-88. See also Friedman-1986, pp. 440-47. Olson's taxonomy of groups - privileged
(small); intermediate, and latent (large)  in 7be Logic of Collective Action treats the two factors group size and relative cost of the public good - simultaneously and thereby slightly confuses the
issue. Hardin-1982, pp. 38-42, clarifies Olson's taxonomy, correctly pointing out that a privileged group
(one in which a single member values the public good enough to pay its entire cost) could theoretically
be quite large.
Admittedly, there is some ambiguity about which cetera remain pares when group size is varied. Some
scholars have consequently challenged the claim that larger groups have greater difficulty overcoming
the free-rider incentive. See Frohlich/Oppenheimer-1970, pp. 104-20; Chamberlin-1974, pp. 707..J.6; and
McGuire-1974, pp. 107-26. The best resolution of these questions is Hardin-1982, pp. 42-49, pp. 125-37.
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beneficiaries would be willing to pay even if exclusion w ere possible and they
could not free-ride . In this manner, the state generates externalities, and ones that
are negative . Rather than overcoming the free -rider problem, the state benefits
free -loaders, who receive bogus public goods at the expense of the taxpayers.
Provision of these goods and services moves the economy away from, not toward,
Pareto optimality. When the bogusness of such public goods is obvious enough,
economists call them transfers.
What is the upshot of this "government failure" for national defense? In the
case of defending the state itself, we are dealing quite clearly with a service that the
state has enormous incentives to provide. If this is a nonexcludable good or service
at all, then it is a public good that benefits small groups very highly. But in the case
of defending the people, we are talking about, in the words of David Friedman, "a
public good ... with a very large public." The benefits, although potentially great,
are dispersed very broadly.17
Thus, to the extent that the free-rider obstacle inhibits market protection of
liberty, it raises an even more difficult obstacle to the state's ever undertaking that
vital service. The state has strong incentives to provide national defense that
protects itself and its prerogatives, but it has very weak incentives to provide
national defense that protects its subjects' lives, property, and liberty. This explains
the common historical divergence between defending the state and defending the
people.
Furthermore, there is a perverse inverse relationship between the people's
belief that the state defends them and the reality. To the extent that they accept this
nationalistic conclusion, their political resistance against the domestic state's
aggression, however weak because of the public-goods problem to begin with,
decreases further. This is most noticeable during periods of actual warfare. The
belief of the state's subjects that it provides protection actually reduces the amount
of protection they enjoy, at least against the domestic state.
Nationalism thus results in an ironic paradox. It views the state as a
protection agency, but this very view contributes to the possibility that the state
will take on the literal role of a protection racket. Those who decline to p ay for the
state's protection become its victims. This in tum gives the state an added incentive
to find foreign enemies. For without a foreign threat, the justification for the state's
protection becomes far less persuasive. IS
Our remarks have thus far been confined to the democratic state. They
apply, however, even more strikingly to the undemocratic state, insofar as there is
aq.y significant difference between the political dynarrucs of the two types. We
believe that many economists have overemphasized the operative significance of
17

Friedman-1973. p. 189. Lee-1985, p. 46, makes the same obseJVation abou t the political production of
national defense, but because he does not recognize the dilitinction between defending the state and
defending the people , he arrives at a much different conclusion: viz., democratic states w ill
u nderprod uce military defense relative to undemocratic states.
18
A similar point is mad e by Boulding-1963, pp. 3-27. He refers to the world's competing military
organizations as "milorgs" and insists that, in contrast to any other social enterprise (including police
.Protection), military organizations generate their own demand. "The only justification for the existence
of a milorg is the existence of another milorg in some other place .... A police force is not justified by the
~existence of a police force in anmher town, d1at is, by ~mother institution of the same kind" (p. 10).
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formal voting. Both types of states are subject to the influence of groups that
marshal resources in order to affect policy. Formal voting only makes it possible
for some changes to manifest themselves faster and less painfully.
Our argument does not rule out the possibility that the state might actually
defend its subjects. Whereas the difference between the political dynamics of
democratic and undemocratic states is overdrawn, states do differ markedly in the
amount of aggression they commit against their own subjects. If we automatically
assume that a conquering government can wield as much power over foreign·
populations as it does over its domestic subjects, then a relatively less oppressive
government will, in the process of defending itself, provide some protection for its
subjects. But this is often only an unintended positive externality.
Moreover, a military policy designed primarily to defend the state's
prerogatives will generally differ from what would be sufficient for the protection
of its subjects. This difference may unnecessarily involve the people in dangerous
military commitments and adventures. Their lives, liberty, and property, beyond
being sacrificed to the interests of the domestic state, will then be at greater risk
from foreign governments as well. Even when countering oppressive governments,
national defense therefore generates negative externalities that may more than
offset the possible positive externality.
Above all, the value of this defense hinges entirely upon the assumption
that conquering governments can oppress a foreign population more fully and
easily than can that population's domestic government. But this assumption is
highly simplistic. It treats the power of the state as exogenously determined. Yet, if
our concern is for the protection of people's lives, property, and liberty from any
state, then a state's oppressiveness becomes the most critical variable of all. One
state's military policy might not only directly affect the liberty of its own subjects,
but it might also indirectly influence the power of opposing states. Only a more
sophisticated under-standing of oppression's fundamental determinants can tell us
how best to ward off foreign aggression.

' 

•'

6. The free-rider dynamics of social consensus
To this point, our conclusions have been somewhat pessimistic, justifying
Earl Brubaker's observation that the free-rider assumption makes economics a
dismal science.19 Based on that assumption, neither the market nor the state has
much incentive to provide any direct protection of peoples' lives, property, and
liberty. To the extent that historical accident has resulted in marked differences in
the power of various states over tqeir own subjects, some such protection might be
produced as an unintended externality of the state's effort to protect its own
territorial integrity. But that very effort at self-protection will also have a significant
countervailing negative impact on the degree to which the state aggresses against
its own subjects.

i·

19 Brubaker-1975, p. 153.
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Attributing a difference to historical accident, however, is simply another
way of saying that the difference is unexplained. Not' until we explain the marked
differences in domestic power of the world's states will we fully comprehend the
relationship between protecting the state and protecting the people .
One naive explanation common among economists is the public-goods
theory of the state. This theory often rests upon a sharp dichotomy between two
types of states, usually democratic and undemocratic . Undemocratic states
according to this theory are little better than criminal gangs, run by single despots
or small groups of oligarchs essentially for their own personal ends. The subjects of
these states suffer under their rulers but can do very little about their plight. Any
effort on their part to change the situation, whether through violent revolution or
other means, produces an outcome that is a public good; again, we are caught in
the free-rider trap.20
Democratic states, in contrast, are the result of social contracts. According
to the public-goods theory of the state, people create democratic states to solve the
free -rider problem. At some obscure moment in the past, they drew up
constitutional rules in which they agreed to be coerced in order to provide public
goods for themselves. Over time, because the freerider problem genefates
"government failure," democratic states have a tendency to fall under the influence
of special interests. Perhaps better constitutional decision rules could alleviate this
decay. Nonetheless, democratic states always retain vestiges of their public-goods
origin. That is why they aggress against their own subjects far less than do
undemocratic states. 21
We do not have to turn to the readily accessible historical evidence to
refute this naive theory about the origin of democratic states. The theory's
proponents quite often do not literally believe it. Instead, tl1ey view the theory as
merely explaining the conceptual nature rather than the concrete origin of the
democratic state. Either way, however, the theory has an inner contradiction.
Creating a democratic state of this nature is a public good itself. A very large group
must in some manner have produced it. Because of the free-rider problem, they
have no more incentive to do that than to revolt against an undemocratic state or to
provide tl1emselves an y other nonexcludable benefit.22
A more realistic alternative to the public-goods theory of the state is what
we can call the socialconsensus theory of the state. All states are legitimized
monopolies on coercion. The crucial word is "legitimized." This legitimization is
what diffe rentiates states from mere criminal gangs. Any society in, which people
refrain from regularly killing each other enjoys some kind of social consensus. No
government rules through brute force alone, no matter how undemocratic. Enough

°
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For the argument that revolution is a public good, see Tullock-1971, pp. 89·99, which became with
minor alterations one of the chapters of his book, Tullock-1974 . Tullock distinguishes between what be
calls "exploitative" and "cooperative• governments, rather than democratic and undemocratic, but the
two classifications are almost identical.
.
21
The public-goods theory of the democratic state is still stated best in Baumoi-J 965, p. 57.
22
Kalt-1981, pp. 565-84, pinpoints the contradiction in the public-goods theory of the state. 111e still
devastating, classic, point-by-point refutation of the social contract remains Spooncr-1966. See a lso
Eve rs-1977, pp. lflS-94, which traces the literal notion of a social contrat't all the way back to Socra tes.

I
I

364

I

joumat des Economistes et des Etudes lfumaines

of its subjects must accept it as necessary or desirable for its ru le to be widely
enforced and observed. But the very consensus which legitimizes the state also
hinds it.23
The social consensus bears little resemblance to the mythical social
contract of public-goods theory. Whereas the social contract is generally conceived
of as an intentional political agreement, agreed upon explicitly at some specific
moment, the social consensus is an unintended societal institution, like language,
evolving implicitly over time. Sometimes, the evolution of the social consensus can
be very violent. Often, particular individuals or even fairly large groups will
strongly disagree with certain features of their society's consensus. But at all times,
members of society are socialized into the consensus in ways that they only dimly
grasp, if at all. 2 4
Consider a classroom filled with average American citizens. Ask for a show
of hands on the following question: how many would pay their taxes in full if no
p enalties resulted from nonpayment? Very few would raise their hands. This shows
that taxation is involuntary. Then ask the group a second question: how many
think taxes are necessary or just? This time, nearly every hand would go up. This
shows that taxation is legitimized. 2 5
Of course, one of the reasons Americans generally view taxation as
legitimate is because they think it is necessary in order to provide public goods. All
this proves, however, is that, although the public-goods theory of the state is
utterly worthless as an objective description of the state's origin or nature, it is very
valuable as an ideological rationalization for the state's legitimization. It performs a
function analogous to that performed by the divine right of kings under
monarchical states or by Marxist dogma under Communist states.
The social-consensus theory of the state suggests that if you conducted the
same survey about taxation upon a group of average Russ ians living within the
Soviet Union, or a group of average Iranians living under the Ayatollah (and you
could guarantee them complete immunity regardless of how they answered), you
would get similar results. These foreign and "evil" undemocratic states are not
exogenous a nd alien institutions imposed on their subjects by sheer terror. They
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23 Since the definition of the stare (or government) is something political scientists cannot even agree
u pon, ours will obviously be controversial. By "legitimized" (a positive adjective), we of course do not
m ean "legitimate" (a normativ e adjective). Most economi'srs should have no difficulty conceiving of the
state as a monopolistic coercive institution, but noneconomisrs might balk. Members of the general
p ublic appear to have a bifurcated definition of the state, depending on whether it is domestic or
foreign . They view hostile foreign states as simply monopolies on coercion, just like c1iminal gangs,
which is why they fear foreign conquest. They overlook the legitimization of these states. On the other
hand, that is the only element they seem to recognize about the domestic state, overlooking or at least
deemphasizing the coercive element. This dichotomy is only a cmder version of the distinction made by
p ublic-goods theory between democratic and undemocratic states. For an extended defense of the
implications of our universal definition, see Rorhbt~rd-1974, pp. 34-53.
.
24 One of the earliest observations that a social consensus alujays legitimizes the state is Ia Boetie-1975.
Other writers who have since put forward a social-consensus theory of the state include David Hume,
Hume-1963, pp. 29-34; Mises-1966, pp. 177-90; and Sharp-1973.
25 We are confident about the empirical results, having conducted the test ourselves many times.
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are complex products of the culture, attitudes, preferences, and ideas, whether
explicit or implicit, t~at prevail within their societies.26
The vast ideological and cultural differences among the peoples of the
world are what explain the marked differences in the domestic power of their
states. The consensual constraints upon states differ in content, but all states face
them. The Soviet leaders fully realize this, which is why they devote so many
resources to domestic and foreign propaganda. The shifting social consensus also
explains the many changes in the form and power of the state over time. Although
professional economists tend to ignore the ideological and cultural components of
social dynamics, professional historians give these factors the bulk of their attention.
History records that in the not-so-distant past the world was entirely in the
grip of undemocratic states, which permitted their subjects very little liberty.
Democratic states evolved from undemocratic states. States· that now must tolerate
a large degree of liberty emerged from states that did not have to do so. Public
goods theory is in the awkward position of theoretically denying that this could
have happened. It raises an across-the board theoretical obstacle to every
conceivable reduction in state power that benefits more than a small group of
individuals. 2.7 The social-consensus theory, in contrast, attributes this slow
progress, sometimes punctuated with violent revolutions and wars, to ideological
changes within the social consensus.
Thus, history is littered with drastic changes in state power and policy that
resulted from successful ideological surmountings of the free-rider obstacle. The
Minutemen volunteers who fought at .Concord Bridge could not even come close
to charging all the beneficiaries of their action. They produced tremendous
externalities from which Americans are still benefiting today. The Abolitionist
movement produced such a cascade of positive externalities that chattel slavery 
a labor system that was one of the world's mainstays no Jess than two hundred
years ago, and had been so for millennia - has been rooted out everywhere
across the entire globe. We could multiply the examples endlessly. 28
Indeed, the existence of any voluntary ethical behavior at all faces a free
rider obstacle. Society is much more prosperous if we all cease to steal and cheat,
but the single individual is better off still if everyone else behaves ethically while
he or she steals and cheats whenever able to get away with it. Thus, everyone has
a powerful personal incentive to free-ride on other people's ethical behavior. If we
all succumbed to that incentive, society would not be possible at all.
26 Zaslavsky-198.3, has actually conducted fair!}' reliable surveys among Soviet subjects, which indicate
quite unambiguously that the Soviet state is legitimized. Good single-volume histoties that impart an
appreciation for the domestic sources of the Soviet state are Daniels-1985, and Hosking-1985. An
introduction to the various interpretations of Soviet hist01y by American scholars, written from a
revisionist slant, is Cohen-1985.
27
This awkward position is clearest in Tullock's Social Dilemma. The new Society for Interpretive
Economics, codirected by Lavoie/Klamer (Economics Department, George Mason University) is a
welcome exception to the geneml neglect among economists of cul tural and ideological dynamics. We
also cite some specific exceptions below.
28
The premier work on the role of ideas in the American Revolution is Bailyn-1967, while a work that
explores the international repercussions of the revolution is Palmer-1 959-64. A magisterial survey of the
international history of chattel slavery is Davis-1984. On the emergence of the international abolitionist
movement, see his Davis-1975.
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We must avoid the mistaken impression that the government's police
forces and courts are what prevents most stealing and cheating. To begin with, the
initial creation of such a police and court system (at least under government
auspices) is another public good. But far more important, the police and courts are
only capable of handling the recalcitrant minority, who refuse voluntarily to obey
society's norms. A cursory glance at varying crime rates, over time and across
locations, clearly indicates that the total stealing and cheating in society is far from
solely a fun ction of the resources devoted to the police and the courts. Certain
neighborhoods are less safe, making an equ al unit of police protection less
effective, because they contain more aspiring ethical free-riders. If all members of
society or even a substantial fraction became ethical free-riders, always stealing
and cheating whenever they thought they could get away with it, the police and
court system would collapse under the load. 29
In short, every humanitarian crusade, every broad-based ideological
movement, every widely practiced ethical system, religious and non-religious, is a
defiant challenge hurled at the neoclassical economist's justification for state
provision of public goods. The steady advance of the human race over the
centuries is a series of successful surmountings of the free-rider obstacle.
Civilization itself would be totally impossible unless people had somehow
circumvented the public-goods problem.30

7. Beyond the free-rider incentive
If what we have been saying so far is even partly correct, there must be a
serious flaw in public-goods theory. Howard Margolis points out that "no society
we know could function" if a ll its members actually behaved as the free-rider
assumption predicts they will. He calls this theoretical failure freerider "overkill".31
Despite this flaw, public-goods theory explains a great deal, which is why
it remains so popular among economists. It explains why so many eligible voters
do not waste their time going to the polls. But it fails to explain why so many of
them still do go. (We think an interesting empirical study would be to determine
what percentage of economists who accept public-goods theory violate their
theoretical assumptions about human behavior by voting.) It explains why the
progress of civilization has been so painfully slow. But it fails to explain why we
observe any progress at all.

29 Among the economists who recognize the public-goods nature of ethical behavior are Buchanan
1965, pp. 1-13, and Buchanan-1975, pp. 123-29; McKenzie-1977, pp. 208-21; and Notth-1981, pp. 11-12,
18-19, 45-46. See also Parfit-1984.
30 Rothbard-1981, p. 545, makes a similar observation: "Thus the free-rider argument proves hr too
much. After all, civillzation itself is a process of all of us 'free-riding' on the achievements of others. We
all free-ride, every day, on the achievements of Edison, Beethoven, or Vermeer."
31 Margolis-1982, p. 6. See also McMillan-1979, pp. 95-107, Smith -1980 , pp. 584-99 and
Schneider/Pommerehne-1981, pp. 689-704.
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Before we work out the implications of this theoretical flaw for the issue of
national defense, let us digress briefly and try to identify it. It must involve some
weakness in the theory's assumption about human behavior. We make no
pretensions, however, to being able fully to resolve the .weakness. Because this
very issue sits at the conjunction of public-goods theory and game theory, it has
become one of the most fertile areas of inquiry within economics and political
science over the last decade. All we can do is modestly offer some tentative
thoughts about the sources of the weakness.
Two possibilities suggest themselves. Either people do not consistently
pursue the ends that the free-rider assumption predicts they will pursue, or they
pursue those ends but using means inconsistent with the assumption. We will take
up both of these possibilities in order:
1. Do people consistently pursue their self-interest, as the free-rider
assumption defines self-interest? Public-goods theorists have offered not one but
two motives that should cause a person to behave In accordance with the free
rider assumption. The most obvious is narrow economic self-interest. This end
does provide a sufficient reason to free-ride, but visualizing someone choosing a
different end is quite easy. Simple altruism is not the only alternative that will
violate this narrow assumption. People may desire social improvements - libetty,
justice, peace, etc. - not simply for their material benefits, but as ends in and of
themselves, independently present within their utility functions. Patrick Henry may
have been engaging in political hyperbole when he exclaimed "Give me liberty or
give me death!", but he was still expressing a willingness to pay more for attaining
liberty than its narrow economic returns would cover. Perhaps this willingness
should be called ideological; no matter what we call it, it appears to be quite
common in human history.32
Mancur Olson is the most prominent public-goods theorist to argue that a
second motive beyond narrow economic self-interest justifies the freerider
assumption. This second motive applies even to the individual with ideological
ends - ifthe group is large enough. He contends that only rationality in the
plirsuit of whatever end the individual chooses is strictly necessary. The individual
will still choose to free-ride, because for a public good requiring a large group his
meager contribution will have no perceptible effect on attaining the end.33
We could object that an individual 's contribution to a cause is often not
contingent in any way upon the cause's overall success. Consequently, how much
the individual thinks his action will affect the probability of success is often

32

Several scholars are moving in this direction. For instance, Dawes-1980, pp. 169-93; Brubaker-1984,
P~- 536-53; Bany-1978; Higgs-1987, chapter 3; and North-1981, chapter 5. Even Mancur Olson suggests
thts approach in Olson-1968, pp. 96-118, which contrasts economics, the study of rational action, with
sociology, the study of socialization. But the most ambitious effort along these lines is Margolis-1981,
pp. 265-79.
We ~hould note that we attach the adj ective "narrow" to the term "self-interest" to indicate the ~tsage
that tnvolves seeking particular, usually selfish, goals. This is to distinguish it from the broader usage of
the term, which can encompass any goal, including altruism. Whether individuals do in fact pursue their
~:rro_~ self-interest is a question subject to empirical veri fication or falsification, bllt individuals by
fint!ton always pursue their broad self-imerest.
33
Olson-1971, pp. 64-6S.
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irrelevant. Some people refuse to litter, for instance, fully aware that their refusal
will have no perceptible impact on the quantity of litter. Such individuals gain
satisfaction from doing what they believe is proper, regardless of its macro-impact.
In addition to a sense of righteousness, ideological movements can offer their
participants a sense of solidarity, of companionship in a cause, that keeps many
loyal no matter how hopeless the cause.34
But this objection concedes far too much to Olson. As philosopher Richard
Tuck has cogently pointed out, Olson's notion of "rationality" if consistently
obeyed precludes some everyday activities. It does not just apply to an individual's
contribution to the effort of a large group; it applies just as forcefully to the
cumulative actions of a single person on a large individual project. Olson's
"rationality" is simply a modern variant of the ancient philosophical paradox of the
Sorites. In one version, the paradox argues that there can never be a heap of
stones. One stone does not constitute a heap, nor does the addition of one stone to
something that is not already a heap. Therefore, no matter how many stones are
added, they will never constitute a heap. (Of course, in the other direction, this
paradox argues that there can never be anything but a heap of stones.)
One more dollar will not make a perceptible difference in a person's life
savings. One day's exercise will not make a perceptible difference in a person's
health. If the fact that the individual's imperceptible contribution goes toward a
group rather than an individual effort is what is decisive, then we are simply back
again at the motive of narrow self-interest. No doubt, this type of "rationality" does
influence some people not to undertake some actions under some circumstances.
But just how compelling people find it is demonstrated by the millions who vote in
presidential elections, despite the near certainty that the outcome will never be
decided by one person's vote.35
2. Do people pursue their self-interest but in a manner inconsistent with
the free-rider assumption? Olson, again, has suggested one way that individuals
might effectively organize despite the free-rider obstacle. Groups can link their
efforts at achieving nonexcludable benefits with excludable by-products. Such by
products include low group-rate insurance and professional journals. The incentive
provided by these by-products h elps counteract the incentive to be a free rider.36
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34 Higgs-1987, chapter 3, heavily emphasizes the role of ideological solidarity. Coleman-1966, pp. 49-62,
postulates an individual's psychic investment in collective entities. Buchanan and Brennan, "Voter
Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives," think that this symbolic identification is the major motivation
behind voting.
35 Tuck-1979, pp. 147-56. We can salvage Olsonian "rationality" under two strict conditions. When(!) a
threshold level of resources is necessary before any of the public good becomes available whatsoever,
and (2) people ·end up paying wha tever resources they contribute , irrespective of whether they reach
the threshold or not, it becomes rational not to contribute if a person predicts that the threshold will not
be reached. In that special case, he or she would simply be throwing away resources for nothing.
Notice that these two conditions apply more frequently to obtaining public goods through politics 
which is often a win-or-lose, ali-or-nothing, situation - t11an to obtaining public goods on the market.
In particular, it applies to voting. Hardin-1982 pp. 55-61, analyzes the first of these conditions, for which
he employs the term "step goods."
36 Olson-1971, pp. 132-68. Olson also refers to excludable "by-products" as "selective incentives."
Looked at another way. the byproduct theory converts a full public good into a positive externality of a
private good.
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Prisoner's Dilemmas, with two or more people, cooperation frequently becomes
rational for even the most narrowly self-interested individual. What this work
implies is that in many real-world dynamic contexts, ideological a ltruism or some
similar motive beyond narrow self-interest may not be necessary at all to
counterbalance the freerider incentive.40

8. Conclusion
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We have seen that putting domestic limitations upon the power of the state
is a public-goods problem, but nonetheless one that in many historical instances
for whatever reason has been solved. We have also seen that national defense, in
the sense of protecting the people from a foreign state, is a subset of the general
problem of protecting them from any state, domestic or foreign.
Because of "government failure," the domestic military establishment itself
can become the greatest threat to the lives, property, and liberty of the state's
subjects. The danger from military expansion, moreover, is not confined to its
domestic impact. By threatening the opposing nation, it cannot even unambiguously
guarantee greater international safety. The same threat that deters can also provoke
the opposing side's military expansion.
Perhaps the factors that already provide protection from the domestic state
are the very factors to which we should turn for protection from foreign states. The
same social consensus that has voluntarily overcome the free-rider obstacle to
make the United States one of the freest, if not the freest, nation may be able to
overcome the free,.rider obstacle to protect American freedom from foreign states.
· Nearly all of us desire a world in which all states have been disarmed.
Of course, most of the formal economic models of international relations
are not very sanguine about this eventuality. Yet our analysis points to two
possible shortcoini.ngs in such models and suggests at least a glimmer of hope.
First, they are generally built upon a static formulation of the Prisoner's Dilemma,
whereas dynamic formulations are more realistic and more likely to yield
cooperative outcomes. Second, they generally commit the nationalistic fallacy of
composition, ignoring the interactions of the state with its own and foreign
populations. Like the public-goods theory they emulate, these models are very
good at explaining the cases where disarmament fails. They do not do so well at
explaining the cases where it succeeds- as for instance, along the U.S.-Canada
border since 1871.41

.

·.

f.
r

40 Hardin-1971, pp. 472-81; Taylor-1976; Hardin-1982; and Axelrod-1984. Axelrod corifines himself to
two-person dynamic Prisoner's Dile mmas, while both Taylor and Hardin consider n-person iterated
games. For a good review of the growing literature on n-person games, see Dawes, "Soda) Dilemmas."
41 Britain and the United States demilitarized the Great Lakes in the RushBagot Treaty of 1817. The
process of disarming the entire border was not complete until 1871, however. Both Noel-Baker-1951:1,
and Boulding-1963 appreciate the significance of this example. Economic studies of international
relations that share these weaknesses include l.ee-1985 and Tullock-1974 . Most of the economic work in
these areas has focused upon alliances. See for instance Olson-1966, pp. 266-79; Olson/Zeckhauser
1967, pp. 25-63, Sandler-1 975, pp. 223-39; and Sandler-_1978.
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The domestic production of disarmament is itself a public good,
confronting the same free-rider obstacle that confronts every nonexcludable good
and service. Should a majority in any one nation come to endorse this policy, the
narrow - or not so narrow - special interests who benefit from an armed state
would undoubtedly be willing to commit vast resources to keeping a huge military
establishment. Thus, like all significant gains in the history of civilization, the
disarming of the state could only be accomplished by a massive ideological surge
that surmounts the free-rider obstacle.
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